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The Supreme Court’s data privacy jurisprudence consists 
of only two cases, yet these cases have fueled a circuit split on data 
privacy rights. The Court’s hesitance to foray into data privacy 
law may be because the nonrival, invisible, and recombinant 
nature of information causes plaintiffs’ harms to elude courts. 
Such harms threaten the democratic relationship between citizen 
and state. However, the Court renewed its attention to data privacy 
in NASA v. Nelson, in which the Court may have recognized a 
tension in its jurisprudence and rejected one of its precedents to 
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INTRODUCTION 
Without her knowledge, a government clerk’s blood is 
tested for HIV and pregnancy.1 A police department asks an 
applicant about her off-duty sexual activities and for the name of 
the father of her miscarried child.2 A public school posts a former 
employee’s case of fibromyalgia on the internet and permits 
newspapers to broadcast the report.3 Although data privacy4 
litigation and policy issues are increasing,5 there is no consensus 
among the circuits as to the underlying privacy rights. They 
disagree broadly over which privacy interests are constitutionally 
protected, how to determine which interests are protected, and 
whether a right to informational privacy exists at all.6 The Second, 
Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits recognize a right to 
informational privacy and balance it against the state’s interest;7 
the Sixth Circuit holds that the right only protects intrusions upon 
fundamental interests or those implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty;8 and the District of Columbia Circuit questions the 
existence of a constitutional right to privacy.9  
Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court began to parse privacy 
interests and recognize an interest in nondisclosure of personal 
information in Whalen v. Roe, a case addressing a state’s collection 
of citizen medical records.10 This opinion was followed months 
later by another informational privacy case as the issue of whether 
the federal government could take custody of President Nixon’s 
papers and screen the papers for archival purposes reached the 
Court in Nixon v. General Services Administrator.11 After these 
two cases, the Court fell into a long silence on the issue. However, 
                                                
1 Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998). 
2 Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2011). 
3 Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dept., 578 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2009). 
4 The right to nondisclosure, informational privacy, and data privacy are used 
interchangeably in the case law and literature. This Article will also use these 
terms interchangeably. 
5 ALEXEI PAVLICHEV & G. DAVID GARSON, DIGITAL GOVERNMENT: PRINCIPLES 
AND BEST PRACTICES 240 (2000) (explaining that as the government processes 
increasing amounts of public information, privacy issues continue to grow). 
6 For an overview of the “confusing and inconsistent” application of the right to 
informational privacy by circuit courts, see Gary R. Clouse, Comment, The 
Constitutional Right To Withhold Information, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 536 (1982). 
7 See, e.g., Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dept., 578 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 
2009); In Re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999); Barry v. New York, 
712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th 
Cir. 1981); and United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 582 
(3d Cir. 1980). 
8 See, e.g., J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981). 
9 See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 
F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
10 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
11 433 U.S. 425 (1977).  
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in 2011, the Supreme Court decided a third case on the right to 
informational privacy when it considered the constitutionality of 
the 9/11 Commission’s recommended background checks of 
federal contractors in NASA v. Nelson.12 In the intervening decades 
between Nixon and NASA, the circuits became increasingly divided 
in their data privacy jurisprudence. These divisions are not 
surprising given the scant guidance the Court provided in its initial 
foray into information privacy law. In both Whalen and Nixon the 
Court ruled in favor of the state, thereby avoiding setting a 
benchmark where protection for a right to nondisclosure might 
begin.  
NASA presented an opportunity for the Court to confront 
foundational questions in information privacy law and democratic 
governance. However, the Court again assumed that a privacy right 
of constitutional significance was implicated and concluded that 
the government did not violate the right. These overarching 
similarities make it seem as though NASA merely replicates the 
Court’s previous exiguous approach, bringing into question the 
legal impact of the case.  
This Article examines the Supreme Court’s information 
privacy jurisprudence, describing the complex characteristics of 
data and connecting these characteristics to the litigants’ interests 
and the Court’s difficulty in assessing those interests. The Article 
compares Whalen, Nixon, and NASA and finds that NASA is caught 
between conflicting precedents. Understanding NASA as 
responding to such a conflict leads to two principal interpretations 
of NASA’s legal impact. These competing interpretations create 
different accounts of privacy law, which in turn suggest strikingly 
different consequences for the future of privacy law. In one 
reading, NASA attempts to gloss over the tension in the case law 
and merge Whalen and Nixon into a balancing test approach to data 
privacy rights. This Article argues that the resulting balancing test 
is a) poorly adapted to the nature and prominence of the use of 
information, and b) creates a rigorous dichotomy between the 
parties in which it is almost impossible to vindicate an individual’s 
privacy interest. Another, and more likely, reading of NASA 
confronts the tension in NASA’s precedents and adopts Whalen’s 
approach over Nixon’s. Under this interpretation, the NASA Court 
adopts and mimics a holistic, free-form approach from Whalen that 
more thoroughly accounts for the complexities of information and 
the elusive harms that flow from data privacy invasions. This 
approach focuses on whether disclosures involve public 
dissemination of the data as well as on the context and norms. 
      
                                                
12 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011). 
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This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I examines the case 
law on informational privacy. Part II discusses the nature of 
privacy, contending that the invisible, nonrivalrous and 
recombinant nature of information makes the effects of data 
privacy invasions difficult to perceive. Moreover, this Part 
suggests that data privacy rights have basic constitutional 
implications for the relationship between citizen and state, 
implications that are particularly acute as information collection 
and analysis become increasingly advanced and central to our 
system of governance.  
Part III illustrates two ways of understanding NASA’s role 
in the Court’s data privacy jurisprudence. It contends that while it 
is possible to read NASA as accepting both of its precedents, this 
reading is unlikely. Accepting Nixon entails adopting a balancing 
test, a test that is barely acknowledged in NASA and inevitably 
leads to casting the parties’ interests at inappropriate levels of 
generality. Reading NASA as Whalen’s legitimate heir provides a 
holistic analysis informed by context and norms, considerations 
that help the Court consider complex data privacy interests in a fair 
and feasible way. 
I. A BARE AND CONFUSING DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court has provided scant guidance on a right 
to informational privacy. As Justice Alito wrote, “[t]he Court 
announced the decision in Nixon in the waning days of October 
Term 1976. Since then, the Court has said little else on the subject 
of an ‘individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters.’”13 Overall, the Court created a confusing, incomplete 
framework upon which the circuit courts have built an 
informational privacy doctrine that is inconsistent and untenable.14  
A. The Supreme Court Pre-2011 
1. Whalen v. Roe 
In Whalen, the Court for the first time explicitly recognized 
an individual’s interest in nondisclosure of information, one that is 
different from the familiar decisional privacy right exemplified by 
cases such as Roe v. Wade,15 Loving v. Virginia,16 Griswold v. 
                                                
13 NASA, 131 S. Ct. at 756. 
14 “State and lower federal courts have offered a number of different 
interpretations of Whalen and Nixon over the years.” Id. at 756 n.9. See also 
Clouse, supra note 6, at  538 (detailing the circuit courts’ “misapplication” of 
the right to informational privacy). 
15 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a right to privacy under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to a woman’s decision to have 
an abortion).  
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Connecticut,17 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.18 In Whalen, the 
New York State Legislature passed a law classifying potentially 
harmful drugs into five schedules.19 Schedule I included highly 
abused drugs that serve no medical purpose and cannot be 
prescribed. The remaining schedules included drugs that have 
medicinal purposes but also have the potential for abuse. Under the 
Act, all prescriptions for Schedule II drugs needed to be made on a 
triplicate form with a copy for the prescribing physician, the 
pharmacy and the New York State Department of Health. Schedule 
II drugs included medicines used for migraine headaches, epilepsy, 
schizo-affective disorders, and narcolepsy. The amount of 
information included on the forms was extensively detailed and 
allowed for easy identification of a given patient.  Information on 
the forms included a patient’s name, address, and age; drug and 
dosage; prescribing physician; and dispensing pharmacy. When the 
Department of Health received the prescription forms, it logged the 
information and then recorded the data on tapes for processing by a 
computer. For five years the original forms were kept in a vault in 
a room with a locked wire fence and alarm system, after which the 
forms were to be destroyed.  The tapes were stored in a locked 
cabinet and computers were kept offline when running the tapes. A 
statute and Department of Health regulation prohibited disclosure 
of the identity of the patients. 
Plaintiffs, a group of patients prescribed Schedule II drugs, 
filed suit on the grounds that persons in need of medication would 
decline treatment out of fear for the misuse of computerized data 
and resulting stigmatization as drug addicts. The Southern District 
of New York enjoined enforcement of the Act as a violation of 
plaintiffs’ constitutional privacy rights.20 The U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed based on substantive due process and 
privacy  concerns.21  The  Court  chose  to  address  the  status  of  
 
                                                                                                         
16 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating laws banning interracial marriages on the 
ground that to deny the fundamental freedom of marriage based on race "is 
surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law”). 
17 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of 
contraceptives on the ground that it violated the right to marital privacy).  
18 268 U.S. 510, 510 (1925) (holding that a statute that requires every parent, 
guardian or other person having control of a child to send him to the public 
school in the district where he resides is an unreasonable interference with the 
liberty of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of the child and 
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
19 New York State Controlled Substances Act of 1972, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 
§ 3300 et. seq. (McKinney, Supp. 1976-77). 
20 Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (reasoning that the 
relationship between patient and physician is accorded protection and the state’s 
action was a needlessly broad sweep). 
21 The Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 2101(b) as there was a 
three-judge court in the district court. 
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privacy in the Constitution, noting that the constitutional right to 
privacy remains largely undefined22 and then identifying types of 
constitutionally protected privacy interests. As the Court stated, 
“The cases sometimes characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in 
fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and 
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions.”23 The Court considered neither interest to be 
implicated in this case.  
In assessing the plaintiffs’ interests in nondisclosure, the 
Court began by considering ways that the information could be 
disclosed publicly. In particular, the Court considered public 
disclosure of the data as a result of Health Department employees 
negligently or deliberately failing to maintain proper security.24 In 
finding that these possibilities were not grounds for invalidating 
the statute, the Court reasoned that “there was no support in the 
record, or in the experiences of the two States [California and 
Illinois] that New York has emulated, for an assumption that the 
security provisions of the statute will be administered 
improperly.”25 This program was contrasted with a First 
Amendment case where public disclosure was part of the contested 
program;26 here, public disclosure would result only from a 
violation of the statute. Accordingly, the Court distinguished 
between a case explicitly involving public dissemination and a 
case, such as the one before it, where the Court considered the 
possibility of unwarranted disclosure.  
 The Court next recognized that there was an outstanding 
issue: disclosing information to the employees of the New York 
Department of Health. The Court again made a distinction between 
disclosure to the public and disclosure to government officials. The 
Court allayed the concern regarding disclosure to the state by 
finding that this disclosure was not significantly different from 
prior law and that the disclosure is not “meaningfully 
distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant invasions of 
                                                
22 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977) (quoting Philip B. Kurland, 
The Private I: Some Reflections on Privacy and the Constitution, U. CHI. 
MAGAZINE, Autumn 1976 at 7, 8).  
23 Id. at 599. 
24 In addition, the Court considered use of the data as evidence in a judicial 
proceeding and disclosure as a result of the doctor, pharmacist or patient 
voluntarily revealing information. Neither one was considered grounds for 
invalidating the statute. The first was held to be a remote possibility that would 
not justify invalidating an entire identification program, and the second was not 
a change from prior law.  
25 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601.  
26 Id. at 600 n. 27 (discussing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)). 
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privacy that are associated with the many facets of health care.”27 
While the Court's analysis concerning disclosure to the 
government was short, it considered context—which in this case 
was health care—and existing norms in determining that no right 
to informational privacy was violated. 
The Court included a “final word” noting that it was aware 
of the threat to privacy that results from the vast accumulation of 
information by the government in computerized data banks or 
other government files.28 It further stated that in some 
circumstances there is “arguably” a duty to avoid unwarranted 
disclosures.29 The Court mentioned the collection of taxes, the 
distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision 
of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the 
enforcement of the criminal laws. In conclusion, the Court stated 
that it did not decide any question that would result from 
disclosure of private information or systems without comparable 
security provisions. Discussing such a significant concern in dicta 
is an indication that the Court is shying away from engaging with 
critical issues and providing substantive guidance to lower courts. 
Nonetheless, this concluding statement further hints at the 
significance of the distinction between disclosure to the 
government and to the public. In addition, addressing the vast 
accumulation of information in computer databanks evinces 
concern for bureaucratization, technology, and the power of 
information.  
2. Nixon v. General Services Administrator 
Only months after Whalen, the Court decided Nixon, a 
complicated case concerning separation of powers, presidential 
privilege, the First Amendment, Bills of Attainder, and privacy. 
After President Nixon resigned, President Ford signed into law the 
Presidential Recordings and Materials Act, which directed the 
General Services Administrator to take custody of President 
Nixon’s papers and tape recordings. Under the Act, the 
Administrator was to process and screen the materials and, with 
the approval of Congress, determine public access to the materials. 
Since President Nixon’s private materials were comingled with         
  
                                                
27 Id. at 602. The Court also rejected the argument that the patients’ decisional 
interest was violated because the state had the power to completely prohibit 
Schedule II drugs, and in any event the state was not completely prohibiting this 
conduct. Furthermore, since many patients were still receiving prescriptions, the 
Court did not find that individuals were deterred from receiving medications 
under the Act. 
28 Id. at 605. 
29 Id. 
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more official materials,30 any screening before President Nixon 
could sort and filter his papers and recordings would involve the 
screening of personal materials by the Administrator. Accordingly, 
although the Act required the Administrator to consider the need to 
protect constitutional rights, the Administrator and the archivist 
team would screen and analyze communications with the 
President’s wife and clergyman as well as personal diary 
Dictabelts and the former first lady’s personal files.   
President Nixon claimed, among other things, that the Act 
violated his right to privacy under the First, Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. The District Court of the District of Columbia found 
that the Act was facially constitutional,31 but found the President’s 
privacy claims to be the most troubling of all the issues.32  In 
affirming the district court, the Supreme Court cited Whalen for 
the proposition that one element of privacy is avoiding disclosure 
of personal matters. The Court then cited Katz v. United States,33 a 
Fourth Amendment search and seizure case, to determine that the 
President has a legitimate expectation of privacy. However, again 
citing Fourth Amendment case law,34 the Court held that the 
invasion must be weighed against the public interest. It found that 
the privacy interest was weaker than in Whalen because not only 
was the information protected against undue dissemination, but 
also because the government would not retain long-term control 
over purely personal materials. The Court also believed the statute 
to be the least restrictive means for attaining the pertinent 
presidential material due to its comingling with private material.  
The concurrence and dissent both accepted the majority’s 
use of a balancing test, questioning only which public interests 
could outweigh President Nixon’s privacy interests. The 
concurrence stated that mere historical significance is not sufficient 
for the government to retain personal materials, and that the 
majority was not holding as such because all personal information 
                                                
30 Prior to this statute, Presidents controlled which of their materials would be 
archived, therefore President Nixon had no reason to separate his personal and 
private communications.  
31 The court reasoned that the proportion of materials implicating privacy 
interests was quite small, as most of the materials related to Presidential duties 
to which “great public interest” attached. Id. at 358. Then, by explicitly 
performing a balancing test, the court found the intrusion reasonable because the 
public interest outweighed the President’s privacy interests. The court also 
found that the measure was carefully tailored and was the least intrusive means 
to obtain the relevant information.  
32 Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 357 (D.D.C. 1976). 
33 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967). 
34 Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977) (citing Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
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was to be returned to President Nixon.35 In his dissent, Chief 
Justice Burger described the public interest asserted by the 
government as a “generalized need” and believed the President’s 
privacy interest outweighed this need.36 Chief Justice Burger 
contrasted the case with Whalen, arguing that Whalen dealt with 
dangerous drugs rather than personal, private business and political 
confidences.37 Thus, as the dissent indicates, Nixon is a difficult 
case because private information included in the screening was of 
no public import. 
B. The Supreme Court Speaks After Thirty Years in 
NASA v. Nelson 
The Court began NASA by harkening back to the privacy 
right cited in Whalen and Nixon and proceeded to find that the 
right was not violated in the case before it. In NASA, due to a new 
Department of Commerce Directive, employees working at the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) operated by the California Institute of 
Technology (CalTech) were subject to a standard federal 
background check. After 9/11, the government sought to increase 
security among its workforce by requiring contractors to undergo a 
National Agency Check with Inquiries (NACI), the same 
background check as federal civil servants. As JPL is owned by 
NASA and only operated by CalTech under a government contract, 
JPL contractors had to undergo the NACI. The contractors 
previously were not required to undergo such a background 
investigation.  
The NACI involves a Standard Form 85 (SF-85) and an 
Investigative Request for Personal Information. The SF-85 requires  
information such as name, address, employment information, 
personal and professional references, citizenship and military 
service, and whether the employee has “used, possessed, supplied, 
or manufactured illegal drugs” in the last year, and, if so, details 
about the activity and “any treatment or counseling received.”38 
The government then processes the information through FBI and 
government databases and sends questionnaires to former 
employers, schools, landlords, and references.  
The Investigative Request for Personal Information, known 
as Form 42, is the questionnaire sent to former landlords and 
references and asks whether the recipient has “any reason to 
question” the employee’s “honesty or trustworthiness,” and               
  
                                                
35 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 484 (White, J., concurring).  
36 Id. at 529 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (drawing language of “generalized need” 
from United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).  
37 Id. at 533. 
38 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 748 (2011). 
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whether the reference knows of any “adverse information” 
concerning the employee’s violation of the law, financial integrity, 
abuse of alcohol and/or drugs, mental or emotional stability, 
general behavior or conduct, or other matters.39 The form asks for 
an explanation regarding the presence of any of the above traits, as 
well as for derogatory or favorable information that may relate to 
suitability for government employment or security clearance. A 
“suitability matrix" was posted temporarily on the JPL intranet site 
that listed factors for suitability for federal employment. Factors 
included “carnal knowledge,” “health issues,” “mental, emotional, 
psychological, or psychiatric issues,” and “criminal and immoral 
conduct.” In addition, the document stated that “homosexuality,” 
“adultery,” and “illegitimate children” might pose security issues if 
there could be “susceptibility to coercion or blackmail.”40 
Although the suitability matrix was removed from the JPL site and 
the issue was not considered before the Court, the Court mentioned 
the matrix in its opinion41 and the issue was extensively briefed. 
Indeed, the broad factors listed on the suitability matrix and open-
ended inquiries on Form 42 demonstrate the expansiveness of the 
government’s data collection. The suitability matrix also 
demonstrates how easily information is susceptible to unforeseen 
and questionable uses as the data can be used and manipulated 
almost without limit.42  
On the other hand, information on the SF-85 and Form 42 
is provided some protections. The information is governed by the 
Privacy Act, which permits the government to keep records which 
are “relevant and necessary” to an end “required by law” and 
permits disclosure of an individual’s records without consent only 
in certain instances. Under the Act, individuals can access their 
records and request amendments.43  
The plaintiffs claimed that this background check violated 
their right to informational privacy, but the Supreme Court 
disagreed, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s preliminary injunction of 
                                                
39 Id. at 749. 
40 Id. at 754 n.5. 
41 Id. 
42 This is due to the recombinant and nonrivalrous nature of data, see infra 
Section II. 
43 Notably, a common complaint is that the Privacy Act has inadequate coverage 
and enforcement. One example is that agency officials have broadly interpreted 
the routine use clause for agency sharing such that they have “created almost 
unlimited ability to move data among Federal agencies.” HAROLD C. RELYEA, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30824, THE PRIVACY ACT: EMERGING ISSUES AND 
RELATED LEGISLATION 9 (2002). See also Daniel J. Solove, Access and 
Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 
1137, 1167 (2002) (noting drawbacks of the Privacy Act, such as its 
inapplicability to court records and to information that FOIA requires to be 
released). 
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the background checks. The Court focused on two factors—that 
the government was acting in its capacity as an employer and that 
the information is subject to the Privacy Act’s nondisclosure 
requirement. The Court emphasized that the government has a 
“freer hand” when acting as proprietor and manager of its internal 
operations than when it “brings its sovereign power to bear on 
citizens at large.”44 It further held that the distinction between 
employee and contractor is a formalism that has no effect here;  
rather, what is important is that the Court finds that the JPL 
employees perform work “critical to the NASA mission.”45  The 
Court considered the SF-85 inquiry into drug treatment to be a 
reasonable, employment-related inquiry since it works to identify 
which employees are taking steps to overcome a drug problem, and 
Whalen held that measures need not be necessary or the least 
restrictive means of furthering the government’s interests.46  The 
Court then found the open-ended questions to be a reasonable 
measure for differentiating between strong and weak candidates, 
reasoning that a catalog of questions is daunting and that the 
prevalence of similar forms in the private sector evinces the 
propriety of the forms.    
After determining the reasonableness of the government’s 
inquiries “in light of the . . . interests at stake,”47 the Court stressed 
the Privacy Act’s protections against disclosure to the public. The 
Court found that Whalen and Nixon indicate that statutory duties 
“generally allay” privacy concerns.48 Furthermore, the many 
statutory exceptions to the Privacy Act’s nondisclosure bar are not 
significant because an “ironclad disclosure bar” is not required and 
the plaintiffs did not put forth a “plausible scenario” where there 
would be undue disclosures.49 Similar to the Court in Whalen, the 
Justices did not vigorously scrutinize the protections of the Act, 
but rather seemed to adopt a presumption of its adequacy. The 
Justices also did not take into account increasing technology or 
bureaucratization of the state, concerns expressed in the “final 
word” of the Whalen opinion, to consider how the likelihood of 
undue disclosures might change. 
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that there is no 
right to informational privacy;50 he considered the collection of     
                                                
44 NASA, 131 S. Ct. at 757-58 (quoting Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 553 
U.S. 591, 598 (2008)). 
45 Id. at 750. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 761. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 763. 
50 Id. at 765 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia reasoned that the Due Process 
Clause only protects procedural rights and that “mere disclosure of private 
information” would not invoke procedural protections since defamation does not 
qualify for such protections. Justice Thomas also argues that the Constitution 
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information here to be a problem under the Fourth Amendment.51 
This distinction between a Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenge 
contrasts with the reasoning in Nixon, which blended the two 
Amendments together. It also illustrates the general confusion as to 
where privacy interests lie. 
II. THE NATURE OF INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY   
Important in the adjudication of privacy interests is the 
consideration of the meaning and purpose of privacy and, more 
precisely, data privacy. Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren first 
recognized a right to privacy in their famous 1890 Harvard Law 
Review article, describing privacy as the “right to be let alone.”52 
Cogent as this definition may be, it provides little legal guidance.53 
Indeed, the concept of privacy has been a particular quagmire for 
the development of legal doctrine, which has been described as 
exploring an unknown swamp54 and as indefinable.55 How 
amenable privacy is to definition remains an open question, but the 
prolonged irresolution to date evinces its elusive and multi-faceted 
nature. Robert Post relays that “[p]rivacy is a value so complex, so 
entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged 
with various and distinct meanings” that he “despair[s] whether it 
can be usefully addressed at all.”56 Indeed, privacy interests 
pervade the Constitution from its penumbras57 to the First,58 
                                                                                                         
does not protect a right to informational privacy. Id. at 769 (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  
51 Yet even under the Fourth Amendment Justice Scalia did not recognize a 
constitutional violation because he found that inquiring with third parties as part 
of the background investigation does not fall within the meaning of Fourth 
Amendment searches. Id. at 765 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
52 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 193 (1890). 
53 ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, at ii 
(1997). 
54 JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 3 (1992). 
55 SERGE GUTWIRTH, PRIVACY AND THE INFORMATION AGE 41 (2002). 
56 Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001). 
57 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a 
Connecticut law that prohibited the use of contraceptives on the ground that it 
violated the right to marital privacy found in the "penumbras" and "emanations" 
of other constitutional protections). 
58 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom 
of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .”); see, e.g., 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that the state could not force 
the NAACP to disclose membership lists as the individuals have a right to 
privacy that protects them from harassment).  
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Third,59 Fourth,60 Fifth,61 Ninth,62 and Fourteenth63 Amendments. 
Unsurprisingly, the judiciary has struggled to adjudicate privacy 
interests. In an effort to clarify the law, the Supreme Court 
recognized in Whalen “at least two” kinds of privacy interests 
rooted in the Due Process Clause: “[O]ne is the individual interest 
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, the other is the interest 
in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”64  
Thus, the Court formulated a rudimentary definition of an 
informational privacy interest as avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters and located the interest within the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  
                                                
59 U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner 
to be prescribed by law.”). 
60 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”). 
61 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be … compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”). For an example of the Court upholding one’s 
right not to testify against oneself, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 
(1966), stating that “[U]nless other fully effective means are devised to inform 
accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity 
to exercise it . . . .  Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he 
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, 
either retained or appointed.”. For examples of data privacy under the Fifth 
Amendment, see Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1997), 
applying Whalen’s recognition of an interest in nondisclosure of personal 
information rooted in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
62 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.”); see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 491 (1965) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (“To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so 
deep-rooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed 
because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first eight 
amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it 
no effect whatsoever.”). 
63 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); see, e.g., Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (sexual acts committed in the privacy of the home 
cannot be criminalized because it violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty 
and privacy rights); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (recognizing an 
interest in nondisclosure of personal information rooted in the due process 
clause); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a liberty interest 
protects a woman’s right of privacy to have an abortion in her first trimester of 
pregnancy). 
64 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.   
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A. Data Traits Conceal Harm from Judicial Detection 
While the Whalen Court helped provide a legal structure 
for unpacking privacy interests via classifying such interests into 
particular genera, the complex nature of privacy, as well as of 
information, still troubles courts. The complexity of informational 
privacy is inherent in the nature of information itself: it is 
nonrivalrous, invisible and recombinant. These traits effectively 
blind judges to the harms at stake in data privacy cases.  
Firstly, information is a nonrival good in that there can be 
simultaneous users of the good; that is, one person’s use of a piece 
of information does not make it less available to another.65 
Moreover, data privacy invasions are difficult to detect because 
they can be invisible. Information can be accessed, stored, and 
disseminated without notice.66 The ability of information to travel 
at the speed of light enhances the invisibility of data access--that is, 
information collection can be the swiftest theft of all. 
Consequently, together, the invisible and nonrivalrous 
consumption of information allows for massive privacy invasions 
without any obvious harm to the invaded individuals.  
Furthermore, information is recombinant: that is, data 
output can be used as an input to generate more data output, and so 
forth.67 For instance, through a developing application known as 
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining processes, data can be 
combined to “create facts” about an individual; in particular, the 
                                                
65 For a description of how information is a nonrival good, see YOCHAI 
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 36 (2006). However, in the strict 
economic sense, spreading information could potentially diminish the value of 
that information in certain circumstances, such as in the case of groundbreaking 
news or a scientific discovery. See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 
248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918) (holding that when a news service republishes 
information attained from another new service it is “endeavoring to reap where 
it has not sown” at the expense of “those who have sown”); Barclays Capital 
Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, 650 
F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying the hot news misappropriation doctrine to a 
financial news aggregation website using data produced from other financial 
firms). The relevant point here is that users can possess information without 
limiting any other user’s actual possession of that piece of information. 
66 See Solove, supra note 43, at 1194 (explaining that sometimes an individual is 
not even aware that an institution maintains a record about her as she often may 
not see it).  
67 WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 15 (2004) (noting that creators of intellectual 
property use the intellectual property of others as inputs into their creation); see 
also MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 172 (2007) (explaining how a 
terrorist’s information is retrieved and used in conjunction with other terrorists’ 
information to form a pattern, which is then used to assign probabilities to 
predictors in order to build a profile for possible terrorists). 
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likelihood that an individual will engage in a certain type of 
behavior.68 The creation of new knowledge complicates data 
privacy law as it involves information the individual did not 
possess and could not disclose, knowingly or otherwise. In 
addition, as our state becomes an “information state” through 
increasing reliance on information—such that information is 
described as the “lifeblood that sustains political, social, and 
business decisions”69—it becomes impossible to conceptualize all 
of the possible uses of information and resulting harms.70 Such a 
situation poses a challenge for courts whom are effectively asked 
to anticipate and remedy invisible, evolving harms. 
B. Weakened Data Privacy Erodes Citizen-State 
Relations 
Asking courts to remedy the invisible, evolving harms of 
data privacy invasions requires examining what the types of harms 
are. If the harms are difficult to perceive, it is tempting to see them 
as insubstantial. However, such an assumption ignores the effect 
informational privacy interests have on the relationship between 
citizen and state,71 especially the balance of power between the 
two. Almost forty years ago one court recognized that “the 
increasing complexity of our society and technological advances . . 
. facilitate massive accumulation and ready regurgitation of far-
flung data,” presenting problems “not anticipated by the framers of               
 
     
 
                                                
68 KUHN, supra note 67, at 173. 
69 Elbert Lin, Note, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the 
Internet, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1091 (2002) (quoting FRED H. CATE, 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 5 (1997)). 
70 Among other things, information can be used to hack credit card accounts or 
for identity theft generally. For example, on October 25, 2012 the South 
Carolina Department of Revenue Agency announced that its database was 
hacked and about 3.6 million Social Security numbers and some 387,000 credit 
and debit card numbers of taxpayers were obtained. Andrew M. Ballard, About 
3.6 Million SSNs Exposed in Hack Of South Carolina Tax Agency's System, 
BLOOMBERG BNA, Nov. 5, 2012, http://www.bna.com/36-million-ssns-
n17179870754/. The cyber-attack prompted the Governor to issue an executive 
order upbraiding the state’s information technology policy, expressing that the 
“state government’s fragmented approach to IT security makes South Carolina 
vulnerable to serious cyber and information breaches and requires immediate 
action to minimize cyber-attacks on IT infrastructure and records.” State of 
South Carolina, Exec. Order No. 2012-10, http://governor.sc.gov/ 
ExecutiveOffice/Documents/2012-10%20Reviewing%20IT%20Security.pdf. 
71 While corporate practices also pose concerns regarding an individual’s 
privacy, the relationship between individual and government is of constitutional 
import. Adjudicating privacy rights against corporate actors is another avenue 
for research.  
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the Constitution.”72 The court further noted that “[t]hese 
developments emphasize a pressing need to preserve and redefine 
aspects of the right of privacy to insure the basic freedoms 
guaranteed by this democracy.”73  
The connection between informational privacy and 
democratic freedoms stems from the prominent role data plays in 
governance and power. Harlan Cleveland argues that: 
Government is information. Its employees are 
nearly all information workers, its raw material is 
information inputs, its product is those inputs 
transformed into policies, which are simply an 
authoritative form of information. So in a narrow 
sense, to consider government information policy is 
not far from considering the essence of government 
itself.74  
Moreover, the combination of technology with control of 
data flow has been described as a “tool of enslavement” for society 
if the power is abused.75 This dynamic can be observed in the 
classic case of a bribe—if X is aware of a potentially embarrassing 
or personal fact, or even myth, regarding Y, X can bribe Y in 
exchange for not using or disseminating the information pertaining 
to Y. The released Guantanamo prisoners who struggled for a 
                                                
72 Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 725 (D.D.C. 1971) (footnotes omitted), 
rev’d on other ground sub. nom. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
73 Id. A few years later the executive Privacy Protection Study Commission 
echoed this sentiment, “[N]ew avenues and needs for collecting information, 
particularly when coupled with modern information technology, multiply the 
dangers of official abuse against which the Constitution seeks to protect. . . . 
[W]hile our efforts to protect ourselves against them must ultimately be 
fashioned into law, the choices they require are not mere legal choices; they are 
social and political value choices of the most basic kind.” PERSONAL PRIVACY IN 
AN INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY 
COMMISSION (1977), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1977privacy/ 
c1.htm. 
74 Harlan Cleveland, Government is Information (But Not Vice Versa), 46 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 605, 605 (1986); see also Lillian R. BeVier, Information About 
Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for 
Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455 (1995) (“Information 
supplied by citizens to government is the indispensable handmaiden of the 
modern activist state.”). 
75 Robert S. Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New 
Technological Age, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893, 987 (1983-84). A well-known 
literary example is the Orwellian surveillance state, which epitomizes how the 
lack of privacy transforms how a community functions. In 1984, the state holds 
access to practically unlimited information about each person, enabling the state 
to identify and track anyone with even a scintilla of suspected disloyalty to the 
government.  Furthermore, Orwell sharply captures how information control 
makes the past mutable as the government changes historical facts about 
individuals and events. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).  
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country to allow them into their borders illustrates a more extreme 
case.76 The released prisoners’ rejection reveals how merely 
associating an individual with a possible set of facts, even untrue 
facts, can significantly impact an individual’s liberty and future 
societal integration. Thus, data access can easily empower the 
receiver while dangerously degrading the individual to whom the 
data pertains. 
Moreover, the reliance on data to understand individuals 
impacts our concept of personhood.  Information and data flow are 
increasingly central to social and economic ordering as individuals 
become identified by an extensive set of information such as tax 
records, voting eligibility, and government-provided 
entitlements.77 One scholar argues that the ways in which our 
digital biographies are used results in growing dehumanization, 
powerlessness, and vulnerability for individuals.78 This 
phenomenon points to an emerging link between data collection 
and the construction of personhood. Unfortunately, the effect on 
personhood is reducing individuals to mere composites of 
transactional data, debasing our understanding of individual and 
citizenship. Such debasement also carries with it the risk of 
misrepresentation.  Information is liable to distortion and can be 
taken out of context. For example, quick impressions and 
fragments of information are likely to “oversimplify and 
misrepresent our complicated and often contradictory 
characters.”79 In effect, data collection and analysis can be a 
demoralizing process and can create a false image of an individual. 
Thus, broad government access to an individual’s information can 
significantly upset the delicate balance of power in a democracy 
between citizen and state.  
Informational privacy is a complex concept that is prone to 
elusive harms. The judiciary has struggled for over three decades 
to create a viable legal construct to define and consider such 
harms. The lack of a viable construct is troubling given the            
 
                                                
76 Lara Setrakian, Guantanamo's Innocents: Newly Released Prisoners Struggle 
to Find a Home, ABC NEWS, May 23, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/ 
International/story?id=1997083.  
77 Solove, supra note 43, at 1143-47; see also Charles A. Reich, The New 
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733-37 (1964) (discussing the increase in 
government entitlements and licensing). 
78 Solove, supra note 43, at 1141. 
79 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN 
AMERICA 9 (2000). Harlan Cleveland describes information as compressible in 
that information can be concentrated, integrated, summarized, and miniaturized. 
The risk of such compression is that “[I]nformation is bound to be lost [and] 
what is lost may turn out to be trivial or merely interesting, but it could also turn 
out to be critically relevant.” Harlan Cleveland, Information as a Resource, THE 
FUTURIST, Dec. 1982, at 34, 37. 
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advanced data collection systems that continue to emerge. If the 
judiciary is going to play a role in understanding data privacy 
interests and balancing power between citizen and government, it 
is time to assess its doctrine. 
III.       ANY ROLE FOR NASA? 
Over the thirty years between Nixon and NASA a wealth of 
data privacy cases surfaced in the lower courts. However, the 
Court did not resolve the split among the circuits in its NASA 
decision last year. The lower courts have spoken back, one 
asserting that “the verdict on informational privacy [after NASA] is 
an unequivocal ‘who knows’ . . . . and leaves unresolved a circuit 
split containing a wide range of opinions,”80 and another asserting 
that NASA “has not provided [this circuit] with any reason to . . . 
revisit our past precedents . .  . .”81 Thus, the question arises as to 
what, if anything, NASA contributes to data privacy jurisprudence. 
The answer may be what the above courts proclaim: NASA 
offers very little, merely continuing the Court’s haphazard 
approach. On the other hand, one may see the Court as identifying 
and responding to tension between NASA’s precedents. Upon close 
examination it appears that Whalen and Nixon fundamentally 
conflict, and that this conflict lies at the heart of the circuit split. 
That is, Nixon clearly invokes a balancing test and Fourth 
Amendment case law to protect privacy interests, while the 
approach taken in Whalen does not explicitly invoke either of 
these, engaging instead in a broader, more fluid analysis. In this 
vein, one could view NASA as a tiebreaker case that entrenches 
certain principles in informational privacy jurisprudence.  
However, which principles NASA adopts is unclear. This Article 
argues that there are two principal interpretations of NASA. One 
interpretation is that the NASA Court is attempting to piece 
together a balancing test from both Whalen and Nixon to solidify a 
uniform approach. In another interpretation, the Court is adopting 
Whalen over Nixon, eschewing a Fourth Amendment analysis. 
These contrasting approaches provide different possibilities for the 
Court’s ability to work through data privacy issues.   
A. NASA as Forming a Trilogy 
One interpretation of NASA is that it weaves Whalen and 
Nixon together to form a balancing test for constitutional 
information privacy claims. Already NASA has been described as 
employing a type of balancing test by Justice Scalia, as his 
concurring opinion in NASA characterized the Court’s approach as 
                                                
80 Elkins v. Elenz, No. 8:11 Civ. 2817 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 2012).  
81 Lee v. City of Columbus, 636 F.3d 245, 260 n.8 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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invoking a “never-explained assumption that the Constitution 
requires courts to ‘balance’ the Government’s interests in data 
collection against its contractor employees’ interest in privacy.”82 
Although it is not clear that NASA adopts such an approach, it is 
possible to understand the Court’s analysis in this way. However, 
this interpretation has severe limitations in its understanding of the 
parties’ interests, as it casts the individual’s interest at an 
inappropriately low level of generality while casting the 
government’s interest at inappropriately high level of generality.  
NASA can be understood as performing a balancing test 
since the Court rules in favor of the government after finding the 
government’s interest to be “strong”83 and the contractors’ privacy  
concerns to be “allay[ed].”84 In the Court’s view, the fact that the 
government was acting as proprietor and the contractors performed 
“critical” roles at NASA, such as serving as the lead trouble-shooter 
for the $568 million Kepler Space Observatory, gave the 
government a strong interest in the conduct of the contractors. 
Also, the Court noted that the investigation was instituted in 
response to a recommendation by the 9/11 Commission,85 and 
considering that the Government’s brief emphasized security 
concerns,86 it can be surmised that security factored into the 
government’s interest as well. In addition, the Court cited Whalen 
to support its reasoning that the protections of the Privacy Act, 
namely the nondisclosure obligations, “evidence a proper concern 
for privacy interests”87 and thereby generally allay privacy 
concerns. Overall, these evaluations of the strength of the parties’ 
interests, in conjunction with a determination that the inquiries are 
reasonable, could be understood as a balancing test. 
B. Resulting Flawed Balancing Test 
1. The Individual’s Interest 
A closer look at the Court’s conceptualization of the 
individual’s interest in NASA, Nixon, and Whalen for purposes of a 
balancing test reveals that not only are there strong doubts as to 
whether          
 
                                                
82 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 764 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). Several 
circuits attempted to read Whalen and Nixon as putting forth a balancing test 
even before NASA.  See sources cited supra note 7. 
83 NASA, 131 S. Ct. at 759 (majority opinion). 
84 Id. at 761. 
85 Id. at 752. 
86 The reply brief notes that “the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001[] 
revealed security vulnerabilities in federal facilities . . . .” Reply Brief for 
Petitioners at 10, NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011) (No. 09-530).  
87 NASA, 131 S. Ct. at 762. 
20
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 15 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol15/iss1/1
MOVING FROM NIXON TO NASA: PRIVACY’S SECOND STRAND—A 
RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 
 159 
whether NASA integrates both of its predecessors,88 but also that 
such an interpretation has dangerous consequences. Interpreting 
NASA as performing a balancing test requires conceiving of the 
parties’ interests in a starkly bifurcated manner of citizen versus 
state that distorts the interests at stake and closes off a 
consideration of the complex nature of data traits. 
When the Court considers the individual’s interest in the 
data privacy cases, it is always based on the individual’s concern 
for the data in the abstract. Such an approach debases the 
individual’s interest because it fails to take into account data 
aggregation. Yet, due to the recombinant nature of information, 
collected pieces of data can be continuously combined with one 
another, as well as with other information available to the 
government, to reveal further information about individuals. 
Daniel Solove explains how privacy can be endangered by 
combining “relatively innocuous bits of information” as the 
combination paints “a rather detailed portrait of our personalities 
and behavior.” 89 Solove calls this problem “aggregation” and 
notes that businesses and government often aggregate a variety of 
information fragments, including pieces of information we would 
not view as private in isolation, to paint such a portrait.90 This is 
especially relevant as the U.S. is an advanced information state,91 
such that fragments of information are readily available and easy to 
combine.92 The Court itself can be seen struggling with a concern 
for privacy in the context of an increasingly bureaucratic and 
technological state. Thirty years ago the Court was troubled with 
the problem that vast data keeping and computerized files posed 
for privacy, writing, “[w]e are not unaware of the threat to privacy 
implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal 
information in computerized data banks or other massive 
government files,” and citing sources describing the assault on 
privacy.93   
                                                
88 See infra Section III.B. 
89 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 70 (2008). 
90 Id. 
91 See Solove, supra note 43, at 1143 (2002) (“[T]he expansion of the 
bureaucratic network of regulation, licensing, and entitlements at the federal, 
state, and local levels resulted in a massive escalation of public records . . . .”). 
92 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, IMS v. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) 
(No. 10-779) (Sotomayor, J.) (“Today with the Internet and with computers, 
there's virtually no privacy individuals have. Any transaction you do could be 
spread across the world instantaneously.”). The ability to manipulate 
information via data mining raises a new level of concerns for individuals and 
courts beyond the revelation of a single fact; rather, behavioral probabilities can 
be assigned to individuals. KUHN, supra note 67, at 173. For an example of a 
case grappling with data mining and pattern matching processes see IMS v. 
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011), a First Amendment privacy case.  
93 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 & n.34 (1977) (citing Barry B. Boyer, 
Computerized Medical Records and the Right to Privacy: The Emerging Federal 
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The Court also casts the individual’s interest at too low a 
level of generality because it fails to take into account the full 
consequences of disclosure to the government. The Court merely 
considers the individual’s reputational concerns.94 Whalen, the 
seminal case on an informational privacy right, considered whether 
the reputational impact of the statutory patient-identification 
program on Schedule II drug patients was sufficient to be an 
invasion of any right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.95 
But, as discussed above, privacy runs much deeper than reputation; 
it is integral to maintaining the appropriate balance of control in 
citizen-state relations even when there is no disclosure of 
information to the public.96 For instance, unmasking bits of an 
individual’s identity creates an informational advantage in the state 
that threatens basic democratic liberties.97 Moreover, becoming 
associated with bits of data degrades an individual’s personhood, 
while the holder of the data has the ability to manipulate the 
information in Orwellian, self-serving ways. In effect, the Court 
overlooks critical concerns; the Court analyzes the individual’s 
interest in data privacy in a shallow fashion and marginalizes the 
deeper interest in preventing any disclosure of information. 
2. The Government’s Interest 
In contrast to the Court’s narrow description of the 
individual’s interest in data privacy cases, the Court casts the 
government’s interest at too high a level of generality and also fails 
to aptly scrutinize the interest. Correctly classifying the 
government’s interest without being lured into broad, lofty 
descriptions such as “national security” or “war on drugs” may be 
difficult whenever the government litigates on behalf of the public 
interest.  NASA is an illustrative case study as it grapples with the 
government’s asserted interest in security, one of the most 
prominent justifications today for invasions of privacy.98 In NASA, 
                                                                                                         
Response, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 37 (1972); Arthur R. Miller, Computers, Data 
Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 
(1972); and ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971)). 
94 The Court’s limited consideration may be partly attributable to the parties’ 
failure to raise broader issues in their briefs. 
95 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04. Whalen considers an interest in independence, 
but this consideration is not in regards to informational privacy, but for 
decisional privacy. 
96 See supra Section II.B. 
97 Id. Alex Aleinikoff describes the Court’s attempt to quantify immeasurable 
litigant interests (such as privacy and other civil rights) and “strike the 
unstrikeable balance” in its balancing test as depreciating the value of some of 
the interests at stake. Alex Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of 
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 975 (1987). 
98 Another example is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secure Flight 
Program, which requires all airlines to provide a passenger’s name, date of birth, 
22
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 15 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol15/iss1/1
MOVING FROM NIXON TO NASA: PRIVACY’S SECOND STRAND—A 
RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 
 161 
the federal government made its background investigations 
applicable to contractors in response to a recommendation by the 
9/11 Commission,99 and in response the Court found that the 
government has an interest in “securing its facilities.”100 Thus, 
NASA is one manifestation of the outburst of concern for terrorism 
post-9/11 that provided a platform for the government to 
accumulate broad powers to surveil individuals and collect data.101 
Indeed, the threat anonymity can pose for national security 
indicates why the government sought to “know” each of its 
employees and contractors.102 Accordingly, national security has 
become a formidable interest with which to contend, whereby even 
concerns regarding torture struggle to compete with security 
justifications.103 However, the formidable nature of a national 
security interest should cause courts to invoke it cautiously, 
especially with respect to informational privacy claims where the 
                                                                                                         
gender, and known redress number to the Transportation Security 
Administration. Secure Flight Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1250693582433.shtm (last visited Jan. 3, 
2013). 
99 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 752 (2011). 
100 Id. at 758 (citing Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598-99 
(2008)). 
101 The passage of the USA Patriot Act, release of the 9/11 Report, and passage 
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act of 2004 caused an increase in 
government-mandated information sharing among branches, agencies and 
departments within the government to improve intelligence and law 
enforcement. See generally RICHARD A. BEST JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41295, INTELLIGENCE REFORM AFTER FIVE YEARS: THE ROLE OF THE 
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (2010). 
102 See, e.g., DENNIS BAILEY, THE OPEN SOCIETY PARADOX 26-27 (2004) 
(“[A]nonymity has become one of the central vulnerabilities of an open society. 
Freedom may have allowed [the 9/11 terrorists] to rent an apartment, use a cell 
phone, meet with terrorists overseas . . . but anonymity kept hidden the manner 
in which these individuals' actions fit together into a larger mosaic of death.”). 
103 There is an active debate regarding justifying the use of torture in the War on 
Terror. Alan Dershowitz, a civil libertarian, argues in favor of torture under 
controlled circumstances because there is little possibility that potentially 
catastrophic attacks can be deterred by “the threat of retaliation against a 
phantom enemy who welcomes martyrdom” and that a democratic nation surely 
should not simply wait until an "armed attack occurs" and then engage in 
retaliatory self-defense. Alan Dershowitz, Should We Fight Terror with 
Torture?, THE INDEPENDENT, July 3, 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ 
world/americas/alan-dershowitz-should-we-fight-terror-with-torture-
406412.html. In contrast, the President of the Supreme Court of Israel, Aharon 
Barak, in holding that torture could not be justified even for securing 
information to prevent terrorism, stated that “[A]lthough a democracy must 
often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. 
Preserving the Rule of Law and recognition of an individual’s liberty constitutes 
an important component in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, 
they strengthen its spirit and its strength and allow it to overcome its 
difficulties.” HCJ 5100/94 Public Comm. Against Torture v. State of Israel 
53(4) PD 817, 845 [1999] (Isr.).  
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harms to the individual are not easily recognizable. To its credit, 
the NASA Court did not accept the government’s invitation to 
dwell at length on 9/11 concerns,104 and the Court emphasized the 
government’s role as an employer. Yet despite the Court’s 
emphasis on the employment context, allowing even a backdrop of 
security concerns in NASA makes for a remarkable characterization 
of the government’s interest given that the NASA facility is 
operated by a university and engages in scientific research such as 
“the star formation of the history of the universe.”105 Such facts 
should make the government’s interest in NASA follow more along 
the lines of an interest in a competent workforce and less like a 
security matter of concern to the 9/11 Commission.  
Moreover, asserting a national security interest can have 
dubious applications as the data collection may actually diminish 
the nation’s and the plaintiffs’ security. The risk of leaked 
information and lost civil liberties106 are familiar problems with 
government data collection practices. The recent disclosures via 
WikiLeaks illustrate how the government’s collection of massive 
amounts of data in one place or network presents a significant 
vulnerability if that location or network is comprised. Just last year 
WikiLeaks released on its website, among other things, a trove of 
confidential U.S. documents. From the WikiLeaks website “sprang 
everything from Iraq War logs, to profiles of Guantánamo Bay 
prisoners, to the infamous cables sent from the American Embassy  
in Tunisia confirming widespread government corruption . . . .”107 
The WikiLeaks situation demonstrates that the vulnerability of 
                                                
104 See sources cited supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
105 NASA, 131 S. Ct. at 752. 
106 Mention of another parallel to the torture debate is apt here.  Some 
commentators argue that torture enhances security while others argue that 
torture diminishes security. Senator John Kerry argues that “Torture plays 
directly into a central tenet of al Qaeda's recruiting pitch: that everyday Muslims 
across the world have something to fear from the United States of America.” 
John Kerry, Commentary: Torture Weakened America's National Security, CNN 
(Jan. 25, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-01-25/politics/kerry.guantanamo_ 
1_abu-ghraib-torture-guantanamo-bay-prison?s=PM:POLITICS. In contrast, 
Alan Dershowitz argues that torture may be necessary to combat evolving 
threats and that human-rights organizations often fail to distinguish between 
“civilian deaths accidentally caused by democracies despite their best efforts to 
avoid them, and civilian deaths deliberately caused by terrorists who seek to 
maximise civilian casualties by constructing anti-personnel bombs, designed to 
kill as many innocent people as possible, and by specifically targeting crowded 
buses and other soft targets.” Dershowitz, supra note 103. 
107 Jared Keller, Is the Era of Government Secrets Over?, THE ATLANTIC, (June 
20, 2011, 8:40 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/06/is-the-
era-of-government-secrets-over/240674/; see also Cleveland, supra note 79, at 
37 (describing information as “diffusive” as it “tends to leak” and “striv[es] to 
break out of the unnatural bonds of secrecy”).  
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government data at this level of magnitude is not just a possibility, 
but real in the here and now.  
A general problem with balancing is that it involves the 
Court in a policy discussion, where it assesses the value of the 
government’s interest.108 Thus, the Court finds itself in a 
predicament when it invokes a balancing test: it must either engage 
in a policy analysis or rubber-stamp the government’s asserted 
interest. Hence, we find the Court accepting the government’s 
assertion of broad, lofty interests. 
In summary, if the Court is applying a balancing test, the 
attendant conceptualization of the parties’ interests is flawed. The 
individual’s privacy interest is cast at too low a level of generality 
and the ultimate consequences of disclosure for the individual are 
glossed over. In contrast, the government’s interest is cast at too 
high a level of generality and not adequately scrutinized. If the 
Court determines that it will proceed with a balancing test, the 
above analysis at least illustrates how its application in this context 
requires vetting.  
A strong case can be made, however, that a balancing test 
is fundamentally incompatible with the notion of data privacy 
rights.109 A balancing test requires a bifurcated analysis, where two 
separate interests are starkly distilled and opposed. This is 
detrimental in informational privacy cases because the harms 
accruing to the individual are vast but difficult to perceive, while 
the government’s interest is susceptible to grand characterizations, 
with vivid examples in the War on Terror era. Moreover, because 
the judiciary may not be qualified to scrutinize the government’s 
policy justifications, a rubber-stamping of the government’s data 
collection is the likely outcome. 
C.  Displacing Nixon: NASA as Forming a Sequel 
Fortunately, there is a strong argument that the NASA Court 
is tipping the scale away from a balancing test and toward a more 
holistic approach. While the Court still faces the same conceptual 
problems described above, a holistic approach allows the Court to 
better account for these problems and provide a more coherent 
analysis. 
The reasoning in Whalen and Nixon look very different; 
Nixon clearly invokes a balancing test and Fourth Amendment 
                                                
108 Aleinikoff, supra note 97, at 991 (discussing how balancing undermines our 
usual understanding of constitutional law as an interpretive enterprise and 
thereby transforms it into a general discussion of the reasonableness of 
government conduct). 
109 Strict scrutiny may also fall prey to this criticism, as strict scrutiny is like 
balancing with a thumb on the scale on the side of the individual’s right. This 
idea was suggested during a conversation with Professor Alex Aleinikoff.  
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principles, whereas Whalen performs a categorical analysis 
including factors such as the type of disclosure, context and norms. 
This disparity is likely a major factor fueling the circuit split. 
However, since Nixon followed only a few months after Whalen, 
lower courts could not hold that there was a switch in the Court’s 
approach as a result of either evolving policy or even a changing 
bench. Thus, Nixon clouded the interpretation of Whalen, and the 
lower courts attempted to reconcile the cases. While it is clear that 
NASA did not make broad pronouncements concerning the 
disparity between its progenitors, the opinion derides Nixon in 
several ways. For one, the terms “outweigh” and “balance” are 
conspicuously absent from the NASA opinion.110 Secondly, the 
NASA Court describes Nixon as “continu[ing] its discussion of 
Fourth Amendment principles throughout the ‘Privacy’ section of 
the opinion,” as if to distinguish the Nixon analysis from relevant 
Fifth Amendment principles.111 Lastly, the NASA opinion 
noticeably mimics Whalen’s vagueness and rejects Nixon’s 
precision; Justice Scalia describes this phenomenon as he states 
that, “[S]urely one vague opinion [Whalen] should not provide an 
excuse for another [NASA].”112  
Moreover, the reasoning in NASA can be seen as mirroring 
that of Whalen. In both cases the Court considers whether the 
individual’s data will be disseminated to the public. Considering 
the question of whether data is safeguarded (whether by the 
Privacy Act or locked wire fences) can be seen as the Court’s 
proxy for classifying the case as one involving only disclosure to 
the government or one involving disclosure plus public 
dissemination.  As the Court determines that public disclosures are 
not a part of the government’s program and that unwarranted 
disclosures are unlikely, the Court proceeds to consider only the 
propriety of revealing the contested data to the government. In  
Whalen, the Court holds that the disclosures are not significantly 
different from those required under prior law and are not 
“meaningfully distinguishable” from “a host of other unpleasant 
privacy invasions” that receiving health care demands.113 
Similarly, the NASA Court states, “judicial review of the 
Government’s challenged inquiries must take into account the 
context in which they arise.”114 The Court then stresses that the 
disclosures are being made to the government in its capacity as 
                                                
110 The term “outweigh” appears once, in a footnote describing Nixon. It is 
unclear from where Justice Scalia quotes the term "balance" in his concurrence, 
as it does not appear in the majority opinion. 
111 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 756 n.8 (2011). Justice Scalia directly states 
that the case was a Fourth Amendment case. Id. at 765 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
112 Id. at 767. 
113 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977). 
114 131 S. Ct. at 757 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
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employer and notes that private employers request similar 
information. Thus, it is possible to read the analyses not as strictly 
government versus individual with weighed interests on side, but 
as the Court taking a broader view that classifies public versus 
government-only disclosures and considers context and norms.  
Of course, if the Court is making such a significant 
jurisprudential decision in its approach to information privacy law, 
the question arises as to why the Court is not forthright about the 
change. One reason might be that the Court is wary of committing 
to a judicial test due to an ongoing struggle with privacy law 
generally as well as with data interests. Indeed, the NASA Court 
itself states that it is “proceeding with caution” and “leav[ing] 
broader issues for another day.”115 As discussed above, the 
confluence of information’s various characteristics complicate 
informational privacy cases. For one, the nonrivalrous and 
invisible consumption of information can obscure the “invading” 
aspect of data collection. In addition, the recombinant nature of 
information works synergistically with the nonrivalrous and 
invisible consumption of information to make the extent of data 
privacy invasions incalculable. Indeed, the development of 
technology permits data to be reused and recombined in 
unprecedented, seemingly infinite ways. Yet, harms of a 
constitutional dimension are at stake due to the power differential 
that information access can create between citizen and state. 
Owing to these issues, the conceptual problems so poignantly 
recognizable in a balancing interpretation of the Court’s analysis 
plague the Court. In effect, the Court is at a nascent stage with all 
of the uncertainty that accompanies early development, and 
therefore may be proceeding in a hyper-sensitive and timid 
manner. 
Moving forward, conceptualizing Whalen without the 
influence of Nixon produces a framework that can account for 
complex data privacy issues and interests in a significantly 
different, more promising way. Considering harms such as power 
differentials between parties and possible data recombination are 
questionable considerations for the judiciary due to obvious 
foreseeability, certainty, and commensurability problems. Thus, 
such considerations are inappropriate in a balancing test where the 
Court must precisely identify and quantify interests. Fortunately, a 
different framework can better accommodate these considerations. 
The alternative reading of Whalen is a holistic analysis that does 
not require quantifying incommensurable interests or pitting the 
citizen against the state. 
The alternative interpretation of Whalen and NASA accounts 
for context, reasonableness and norms to provide a categorical 
                                                
115 Id. 
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analysis that speaks to principles. In each case the distinction 
between government and public disclosures classifies the 
individual’s interest, which is then further categorized by the 
context and type of data. In Whalen, only disclosures to the 
government were at issue and the context involved a) Schedule II 
drugs, and b) information collected under prior law and typically 
released in health care situations. In NASA, only disclosures to the 
government were at issue again and the context involved a) federal 
contractors, and b) information normally collected by private 
employers.  Rejecting a rigid, bifurcated analysis resonates with 
Michael Chertoff’s observation that policies are not always easily 
classified as pro- and anti-privacy, rather some policies are simply 
trade-offs on different elements of privacy.116 The holistic analysis 
presented above captures data privacy issues at a level that does 
not reduce the debate to being pro or anti privacy; it captures 
norms and principles.117  
At this early stage in the Court’s informational privacy case 
law, there is an opportunity to recognize the complexities of data 
privacy interests and tailor the doctrine accordingly. Developing a 
fluid, holistic framework is more demanding than a straightforward    
weighing of two “opposing” interests. Approaching rights outside 
of a balancing framework involves thinking of rights as 
developments, and as the rights crystallize their limitations are 
embedded within them. This development involves logic, history, 
values, and constitutional norms.118 Whalen and NASA provide an 
excellent foundation, performing a two-part analysis consisting of 
a consideration of the breadth and context of disclosure as well as 
the change from prior norms. Yet, further research is needed to 
develop informational privacy doctrines within this framework and 
to provide both substance and meaning to data privacy rights. 
                                                
116 Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Remarks at the 
Data Privacy and Integrity Meeting (Mar. 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0269.shtm. For a discussion of how 
both individual and government interests can be conceived of in both public and 
private terms see Aleinikoff, supra note 97 at 981. Aleinikoff provides a First 
Amendment example: an individual interest in communicating one’s ideas can 
be stated as a societal interest in a diverse marketplace of ideas. Furthermore, 
time, place and manner limitations on expressive behavior can be stated as a 
government interest in public safety or as a private interest in unencumbered 
access to public facilities. 
117 Helen Nissenbaum defines contextual integrity as “when informational norms 
are respected,” and describes these norms as “govern[ing] the flow of 
information about a subject from one party to another, taking account of the 
capacities (or roles) in which the parties act, the types of information, and the 
principles under which this information is transmitted among the parties.” 
HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 14 (2009). 
118 This conceptualization of rights was formed during a conversation with 
Professor Alex Aleinikoff. 
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Fortunately, privacy interests pervade the Constitution from the 
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
providing principles that will not so much limit, but rather define 
the right to nondisclosure.119  
CONCLUSION 
The Court has continued to struggle with adjudicating a 
right to informational privacy from its initial foray into this body 
of law in Whalen through its decision in NASA.  Nonetheless, the 
Court must confront and engage with constitutional data privacy 
rights in order to bring coherence and direction to the courts, 
regardless of how we ultimately value any such right. The Court’s 
struggle can be attributed not only to the complex and multi-
faceted nature of privacy generally, but also to the exceptional 
characteristics of information. Data interests pose particular 
problems for judges because the nonrivalrous, invisible and 
recombinant nature of information revolutionizes and intensifies 
the harm of privacy invasions while at the same time making the 
harms difficult to detect. Indeed, the harms of data privacy 
invasions range from misrepresentation of individuals to distortion 
of the democratic relationship between citizen and state.  
This Article argues that the Court’s data privacy cases 
conflict and that NASA’s approach to this conflict can be read in 
two principal ways. The different method of reasoning employed 
in these two approaches affects the Court’s ability to engage with 
the complex issues data privacy poses. Whalen, Nixon, and NASA 
can be read as forming a single approach to informational privacy 
rights, that of a balancing test, or read as consisting of competing 
approaches with the fluid, holistic analysis ultimately displacing 
the balancing test. A fluid and holistic understanding of the Court’s 
reasoning conceptualizes the parties’ interests in a way that enables 
the Court to incorporate the parties’ interests with all of their 
                                                
119 Eugene Volokh makes a similar argument in regards to applying strict 
scrutiny to the First Amendment. Volokh argues that there should be categorical 
rules and exceptions based on a theory of the Constitution, stating that:  
“By abandoning strict scrutiny of content-based restrictions—or perhaps even 
intermediate scrutiny of commercial speech restrictions—the Court can shift its 
focus to creating, as best it can, rules that capture its theory about the proper role 
of such restrictions. It could, for instance, say that content-based regulations of 
high-value speech imposed by the government acting as sovereign are simply 
per se unconstitutional (subject to the recognized exceptions). . . . In each case, 
the Court would ask the familiar questions: Does some interpretive theory—
whether tied to the constitutional text, to broader constitutional or moral values, 
to the case law, or to something else—support this distinction? Is the proposed 
rule likely to lead to good results in most cases?  Is the rule likely to be properly 
administered by courts and other government officials?” Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2457-58 (1995-1996). 
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dimensions and complexity into its analysis. Such an analysis 
closely follows the nature of the disclosure and the context and 
norms surrounding the disclosure, without placing the parties’ 
interests into a strict, dichotomous relationship. The suggestions 
presented here for understanding and remedying the Court’s data 
privacy case law are nascent, but identify an opportunity and 
direction for development to prepare for this “battleground of the 
future.”120 
 
                                                
120 David L. Hudson Jr., Privacy & Newsgathering, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER 
(Sept. 14, 2004), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/privacy-newsgathering 
(quoting Lee Levine). 
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